Cryptology and Physical Security: Rights Amplification in Master-Keyed Mechanical Locks by Matt Blaze
This paper examines mechanical lock security from the perspective of computer science and cryptology. We focus on new and practical attacks for amplifying rights in mechanical pin tumbler locks. Given access to a single master-keyed lock and its associated key, a procedure is given that allows discovery and creation of a working master key for the system. No special skill or equipment, beyond a small number of blank keys and a metal file, is required, and the attacker need engage in no suspicious behavior at the lock’s location. Countermeasures are also described that may provide limited protection under certain circumstances. We conclude with directions for research in this area and the suggestion that mechanical locks are worthy objects for study and scrutiny.
NOTICE OF REVOCATION OF INDEPENDENCE by Usenet and The Internet
The Revocation of Indpendence as executed by Alan Baxter & Peter Rieden, 8th Nov 2000, apparently inspired by an email sent by Dan Fox (who claims to be the "ultimate originator") or Kevin O'Connor (who also claims to be the "ultimate originator"). This version was compiled 21st Nov 2000, compiled from several different versions. Early drafts, showing how it grew, are further down. Responses and related pieces are also included further down. Important note: The "Revocation of Independence" is NOT by John Cleese. During 2005, a version was wrongly attributed to him and was circulated crediting Cleese as the author. He did not write it. It was present on Usenet and the Internet long before his name became associated with it.